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Abstract: 
Shadow banking is commonly characterized as the answer of the modern financial industry to 
regulatory arbitrage. The main objective of the paper is to underline the magnitude of fragility 
that lies beneath the sector by analyzing both theoretically and empirically its evolution. The 
study highlights its complex structure, basic components and numerous implications 
accompanied with its function. Precisely, the size and role of investment funds sector is 
examined since its’ growth possess several vulnerabilities. Based on an existing methodology 
and using data from the United States, regarding the period 2002-2015, the study identifies a 
statistically significant relationship between specific sectors of investment funds and money 
demand. The main empirical findings provide robust evidence that investors run towards 
various sectors of investment funds and still constitute to the rise of shadow banking. 
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1. Introduction 
The intense impact that the financial crisis had on economies worldwide, is commonly linked 
with universally interconnected and advanced financial markets. Until recently, traditional 
banks have been subject to criticism and stricter regulations imposed by authorities. Banks 
were accused of incurring too much risk through leverage and by participating in riskier 
activities. Even though banks are expected to better manage market fluctuations and potential 
losses in the future, still there are parts of the financial system which are exposed to the same 
degree of risk as before the crisis, and therefore create instability in the financial sector. 
Banks as a response to constant pressures caused by higher capital requirements, are expected 
to become more integrated and larger in scope, probably leading to greater systemic risk. 
Excessive risk actions could threaten the stability of the financial sector, if appropriate actions 
are not taken to properly monitor and regulate the core of financial institutions. Furthermore, 
stricter regulations could also encourage banks to move their activities out of the regulated 
banking sector, thus creating a regulatory arbitrage. Bank activities that were previously 
conducted by regulated banks, could partially move to the unregulated shadow banking sector. 
In line with Subramanian (2013), shadow banking has become the focal point for the financial 
system at the grass root level1. In general, shadow banks are less regulated than traditional 
banks and, until recently, experienced much less attention from the public. 
Without any doubt, those institutions carry out an important role in the credit intermediation 
process by providing liquidity and transferring risk between market participants. Whereas, the 
growing activity in this non-regulated sector has exposed the entire financial system to a higher 
degree of systemic risk. Consequently, the enhanced fragility in the financial sector is caused 
by close interconnection and dependence among shadow banks at a first stage, and secondly 
between traditional and shadow banks. The growing importance of further examining the 
negative effects of shadow banking, has been made apparent over the recent years. Therefore, 
it is crucial to understand, the different parts of shadow intermediation process as well as the 
different components that engage in the sector. 
Furthermore, the recent market failures justify the need for regulation and supervision of the 
particular sector. Given that, current changes in accounting and capital requirements are 
expected to reduce incentives by banks to engage in types of arbitrage activities, this will 
                                                          
1 According to Subranian (2013), recognized examples of shadow banking institutions include Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers.  
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provide strong incentives for credit intermediation to be funded outside from the traditional 
banking system. In particular, negative externalities can result in terms of neglected risk by 
investors permitting the buildup of systemic risk. For instance, during the pre-crisis period 
several banks moved their riskier activities in vehicles that were not consolidated with them, 
but eventually those institutions were forced to carry these risks across their balance sheets. 
According to prior estimations, the shadow banking sector amounted around $60 trillion in 
2014, which signifies the necessity for deeper investigation, in terms of the potential 
consequences on the real economy. Above all, the public sector has repeatedly played the role 
of the lender-of-last-resort, in order to shield the real economic activity. Directing to achieve a 
stable growth of the economy, we need to focus on the systemic evolution of shadow banking 
system by addressing the risk associated with it. Besides, shadow banking may be well 
positioned in lending and financing more assets in the future, which could possibly lead to even 
greater expansion, due to regulatory arbitrage2 In that context, my analysis aims to empirically 
identify if shadow banking continues to grow rapidly after the recent financial crisis and to 
contribute as an early warning in order to avoid a possible collapse of the sector. 
Motivated by the above reasoning, my research intends to support the ongoing assessment 
concerning the need for increased regulation of the sector. Moreover, this study identifies gaps 
and areas, which can improve future work on shadow banking. Initially, the first part of the 
research includes a theoretical outline, by identifying how has its structure evolved and 
highlight the associate implications in the financial system. Secondly, due to the existence of 
regulatory arbitrage, the main section of my investigation, is directed towards the empirical 
examination of identifying a relationship between the development of shadow banking and 
money demand in US. Therefore, utilizing quarterly data from 2002 until 2015 the aim of the 
study is to identify if the investment fund sector plays a significant role in driving the growth 
of shadow banking. 
The following approach is merely based on a paper by Sunderam (2014), which thoroughly 
analyzed the relationship between ABCPs3 and money demand using data prior to the crisis. 
Another study that motivated my examination, was conducted by Doyle et al. (2016), and 
                                                          
2 The new Basel III guidelines will have the effect of doubling the amount of core equity that a typical big bank 
holds as a proportion of its assets. Meaning that, shadow banking sector may try to finance assets that the banks 
either cannot fund or will not fund because of the new guidelines. 
3 According to Luttrel et al (2012), ABCP: Asset Backed Commercial Papers could be defined as a short-term 
debt instrument financed by a specified pool of assets which is issued by corporations and financial institutions 
to cover short-term financing needs. 
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explores the risks and vulnerabilities in the investment fund sector, which according to the 
authors poses potential threats and should be closely monitored. In terms of the hypothesis 
under examination, a regression analysis is implemented in order to examine if there is a 
significant connection between the development of investment funds and money creation. The 
specific hypothesis is based on Sunderam’s (2014) model which states that, investors treat 
shadow banking activities and Treasury bills as substitutes. Hence, when demand for Treasury 
bills is high, as reflected by low Treasury bill yields, the demand for shadow banking 
intermediary services is increased as well. The hypothesis that my analysis empirically seeks 
to identify is that, investment funds growth is positively related to money demand. Regarding 
the main findings of the empirical study, my analysis indicates the existence of a statistically 
significant positive relationship between selected investment funds and money demand. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The following chapter presents the theoretical 
literature on the topic under examination. Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis regarding the 
broad concept of shadow banking by analyzing its definition, size, structure and components. 
Next, chapter 4 investigates the benefits and implications of investment funds, while chapter 5 
introduces the hypothesis under examination and the empirical analysis. Chapter 6 presents a 
discussion regarding the role of supervisors. Finally, chapter 7 presents the main limitations 
aside with directions for future research and the main conclusions. 
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2. Literature Review 
As a starting point, my analysis explores previous findings of several academics and 
researchers based on the broad topic under examination. It is crucial to initially comprehend 
the concept under investigation, which would definitely allow for a better appraisal of the 
empirical findings. Primarily, one of the first approaches towards the examination of the 
shadow banking was conducted by Gorton and Metrick (2010). The authors, discussed reasons 
for enhanced regulation and monitor of the whole financial sector. Next, an assessment on 
regulatory reforms relating to shadow banking and macroprudential policy is provided by 
Hanson et al. (2011). Besides, Adrian and Ashcraft (2012), review the fundamental reasons 
underlying the existence of shadow banking, by mapping this unknown environment and 
explaining its activities. Pozsar et al. (2012), identified the institutional features of shadow 
banking and compared those characteristics with the traditional banking system. Next, a study 
by Rixen (2013), investigated why regulation nowadays is relatively weak and reviewed the 
impact of recent regulatory measures on the sector. 
Furthermore, various researchers have already set a theoretical base on the subject of shadow 
banking, that future researchers could deliver progress and development. For instance, Samuel 
et.al (2011), reviewed the fire-sale and credit-crunch effects that are associated with shadow 
banking system. Claessens et al. (2012) discussed appropriate set of regulations that could 
probably lead to the shrinking of the system and in parallel maintain its useful economic 
functions. Recent studies by Grochulskiy and Zhangz (2015), investigated the impact of 
shadow banking on optimal liquidity regulation, while Plantin (2015) identified that stricter 
regulations, lead to the creation of regulatory arbitrage which eventually increases systemic 
risk. With the intention to recommend better supervision strategies, other investigations include 
numerous papers conducted by pivotal institutions like the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)4.  
Considering the various geographical areas, a variety of papers focused primarily on the US 
financial system prior to the crisis, where researchers analyzed the structure and entities of the 
shadow banking system. With respect to Europe, an assessment of the shadow banking sector 
is provided by Bouveret (2011), while the functioning of special purpose vehicles in European 
                                                          
4 Financial Stability Board: Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues (2011), 
  Financial Stability: Board Strengthening Oversight and regulation of Shadow Banking (2013), 
  Financial Stability Board: Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report (2015), 
  International Monetary Fund: Shadow Banking Economics and Policy (2012). 
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banking systems is carefully described by Thiemann (2012). Moreover, given that China is 
unquestionably the new key actor in the banking area, studies conducted by Cieślik (2014) and 
Liang (2016) examined the developments and implications of Chinas’ shadow banking sector 
towards financial stability. 
Finally, regarding the subject of modeling and econometrically analyzing the impact of shadow 
banking, a little examination has been conducted to date, since the majority of literature review 
appraise the concept from its theoretical perspective. However, significant effort to empirically 
explore the subject of shadow banking are the following studies. Calmes and Theoret (2010), 
utilized Canadian data considering the period 1988-2010 and identified a positive impact that 
off-balance-sheet activities have on banks returns. Next, Gennaioli et.al (2013), presented a 
model which identified that shadow banking system is broadly exposed to crises and periods 
of illiquidity in the market. Additionally, Chernenko and Sunderam, (2014) empirically 
examined the lending behavior of mutual funds that helped to the transmission of distress 
across borrowers during the crisis. Gertler et.al (2015), investigated the growth and breakdown 
of wholesale banking, and revealed the transmission mechanisms of the crisis to the real sector.  
Eventually, Kessler and Wilhelm (2013), analyzed the topic of data scarcity in terms of shadow 
banking activities, which is considered to be a major drawback of the aforementioned 
investigations, and definitely a clear explanation for the lack of adequate number of empirical 
investigations on the subject under scrutiny.  
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3. Shadow Banking  
In this initial part of my analysis, the concept of shadow banking is carefully divided into 
various sections, in order to provide a complete theoretical background that could eventually 
introduce the empirical section. Hence, the following discussion includes the examination of 
concepts like the definition of shadow banking and the complicated components that contribute 
to its functioning. Next, its structure, size and implications are examined which are 
accompanied by a closing section on the topic of regulatory arbitrage. 
3.1. Definition  
The necessity for better understanding the functions and threats that lurk in the shadow banking 
system, directed the G20 Summit by the end of 2010 to assign on the FSB the oversight and 
report of the system. Until now, the FSB has repeatedly published several reports on the topic 
using quantitative and qualitative information. Taking into consideration the confusion around 
a concrete classification, a relatively general definition is the following: 
 
“The system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular 
banking system”.  
Financial Stability Board (2011) 
 
Furthermore, according to literature review, the term was initially introduced by Paul 
McCulley5 in 2007 at FED’s annual symposium. Thus, it is relatively an emerging term that is 
not yet identified, since most of the activities are still unknown. Even though the term is widely 
used in the media and in policy discussions, there is no clear commonly agreed definition. 
Hence, from the perspective of Federal Reserve Bank the term could be broadly described as: 
 
“Market-based credit intermediation containing entities and transactions outside the 
traditional banking system, which provide credit through long-term illiquid activities with 
short-term borrowing from liquid funds”.  
Luttrel et al. (2012),  
In general, shadow banks rely on short-term market funding and are subject to less- regulation 
than the traditional banking system. Notable, examples that engage in the credit intermediation 
process, include:  
 Investment Banks,  
                                                          
5 Paul Allen McCulley is an American economist and former managing director at PIMCO. 
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 Finance Companies, 
 Special Purpose Vehicles, 
 Hedge Funds, 
 Money Market Mutual Funds, 
 Real estate investment trusts,  
 Commercial Paper Issuers and  
 Insurance Companies. 
The aforementioned components of the system are explicitly being analyzed in following 
section of the paper. However, the exact meaning of other puzzling concepts mentioned in the 
definition, like credit intermediation, securitization and wholesale funding should be defined 
as well at this initial stage of the study. By credit intermediation process, we describe the role 
of the middleman between counterparties in a financial transaction. The fundamental credit 
intermediation chain is depicted in Figure 1 below, in which funds are transmitted through the 
different steps of the chain6.  
Figure 1: Credit Intermediation Chain 
 
Subsequently, in line with FSB by securitization we define the process of pooling various types 
of debt and packaging that debt into securities that are eventually sold to investors. Finally, the 
last step of the chain includes the wholesale funding which refers to huge, short-term 
borrowings from sources other than demand deposits that are used by financial intermediaries 
to finance their operations. 
3.2. Magnitude 
An important feature that motivated my research is definitely the size of the shadow banking 
system. Various researchers provide different estimations regarding the real size. As a starting 
point, it is commonly accepted that the evolution of shadow banking outside the regulated 
sector has expanded over the past years. Specifically, the system developed sharply before the 
                                                          
6 Usually when a financial services company accepts deposits and lends to borrowers. 
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crisis, rising from $26 trillion in 2002 to $62 trillion in 2007. Subsequently, the size of the 
system deteriorated marginally in 2008, but amplified afterwards to reach $66 trillion in 2011 
and $71 trillion in 2012. Nowadays, the debate under examination is between two broad 
approaches. 
The first part of the discussion claims that, it has reached its’ peak in 2008 just before the 
collapse of the ABCPs market, and afterwards it faces a constant decline or remains stable. In 
that context, a relatively conservative estimation is provided by the FSB which argues that the 
shadow banking system has decreased since the onset of the crisis and has remained at around 
25% of its’ previous magnitude. Generally speaking, its’ aggregate size according to the FSB 
is around half the size of the traditional banking system. On the other side, plethora of 
researches argue that even though its size dropped dramatically after the financial crisis, it 
continues to grow rapidly and today is significantly bigger than prior to 2008. 
Figure 2 below illustrates, that the greatest proportion of the system at the end of 2014 is 
attributed in the United States (40%). In terms of the European area an aggregate measurement 
including core countries like Germany, France, United Kingdom, Ireland and Netherlands 
amount for the 32% of the global shadow banking system. During the four-year period that 
Figure 2 depicts, we observe that the distribution among various countries has remained 
relatively constant. By the year 2008, the size of US shadow banking equaled the size of the 
US traditional banking system and continued to grow further. In China, the permanent inflation 
has brought shadow banking to face a sharp increase, from 2% in 2010 to 8% in 2014. In line 
with a study made by the People’s Bank of China in 2010, the shadow lending expanded $10 
trillion, which counts for the 45% of the total lending activities of the Chinese economy. 
Figure 2: Allocation of Shadow Banking Among Countries 
 
Source: FSB, “Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report (2015)” 
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Moreover, an influential study by Fiaschi et al. (2014) argues that the shadow banking system 
is bigger than the aforementioned estimations of FSB. According to the authors, monitoring 
and regulation based on a detailed classification of financial activities is unlikely to keep pace 
with the rate of innovations in the financial industry. Hence, alternative estimations based on 
different approaches came to question previous findings. Their estimations regarding the real 
magnitude of shadow banking reveal a sharp rise in shadow banking activity after 2010. The 
authors, in contrast to FSB findings, claim that shadow banking activity is approximately $100 
trillion and not around $71 trillion as FSB states. The particular difference is straightforward 
at Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: Size of Shadow Banking System 
 
Source: Fiaschi et al. (2014) 
According to the authors, the rise was mainly driven by the concept of regulatory arbitrage, 
which reflects the answer of modern financial industry to regulation. Thus, during the period 
following the global financial crisis, the shadow banking system continued to grow, although 
at a slower pace. In overall, it might not be mistaken to assume that following the huge 
regulation attempts, the system grew even bigger. The main difference between the two 
estimations is attributed to the fact that, the FSB includes in measurement, components which 
are known to have played a major role in the crisis and their decline after 2010 reflects a 
decrease of shadow banking size. The authors argue that FSB approach omits shadow banking 
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activities which definitely contribute to systemic risk awareness. In conclusion, a central idea 
of my analysis is that components, other than those contributing to the “Great Recession” 7, are 
still related to the constant growth of shadow banking, and that regulators should swift their 
attention towards those concealed threats. Precisely, the size and role of the recent expansion 
on the investment fund sector is examined since its’ growth possess potential vulnerabilities. 
3.3. Structure 
The shadow banking system had escaped regulation primarily because it did not accept 
traditional bank deposits from public. To state it differently, it comprises a complex network 
of transactions which transformed the credit intermediation process in the majority of the 
developed countries. For instance, in United States shadow banking normally contains bank 
subsidiaries or associates which have a close linkage with the traditional banking system. 
Hence, shadow banking activities managed to escape regulatory guidelines and supervision. In 
that way, according to Kessler and Wilhelm (2013), the various components of the system are 
able to involve in higher credit, market and liquidity risk. The particular swift in modern 
financial industry occurred in 1999 by the limitation of financial markets supervision and the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall Act8. These adjustments introduced a period known as the deregulation 
of the banking sector, which made the structure of shadow banking extremely complex and 
finally led to the burst of the financial crisis in 2008. The particular section of my research 
refers to this puzzling structure and aims to highlight the most important features of it. 
3.3.1. Credit Intermediation 
Likewise, with the traditional banking system, the shadow banking system conducts credit 
intermediation. Yet, unlike the traditional banking system, credit intermediation is completed 
through a chain of non-bank financial intermediaries in a multi-step procedure. As already 
mentioned in Figure 1, the shadow banking system decomposes the simple process of deposit-
funded lending into a more complex procedure. The new process could be described as a 
wholesale funded, securitization-based lending (Pozsar et al. 2012). In that way, shadow 
banking transforms risky, long-term loans (such a subprime mortgages) into seemingly credit-
risk free, short-term instruments that are issued by various components of the system (like 
Money Market Mutual Funds that are examined in the empirical part). 
                                                          
7 For a detailed analysis on the topic see: Verick & Islam (2010), The Great Recession of 2008-2009: Causes, 
Consequences and Policy Responses. 
8 Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 was the answer of regulators towards the Great Depression and prohibited the 
combination of deposit and lending activities with investments.  
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Credit intermediation contains three separated transformations which are depicted in Figure 4 
below. First, credit transformation which is  the enrichment of the credit quality of debt issued 
by the intermediary. For instance, a hypothetical bank may carry out credit transformation by 
lending to AA borrowers while issuing AAA liabilities. Secondly, maturity transformation 
refers to the use of short-term deposits to fund long-term loans. And finally, liquidity 
transformation refers to the use of liquid instruments to fund illiquid assets. (Adrian & Ashcraf, 
2012) 
Figure 4: Credit Intermediation Components 
 
Subsequently, in line with classical textbook depiction, Figure 5 below illustrates the process 
of the traditional on-balance-sheet intermediation. In this simplified figure, we can observe the 
role of banks as an intermediate in order to direct funds from depositors towards borrowers 
through deposits and loan creation.  
Figure 5: Traditional Credit Intermediation Process 
 
Source: Gordon & Metrick (2010) 
In contrast to the traditional banking system, where the entire procedure of credit 
intermediation occurs via a sole institution, shadow credit intermediation is implemented 
through a chain of several nonbank financial intermediaries in a multistep procedure. 
According to Gordon & Metrick (2010), the complexity of this process could be summarized 
in the five steps illustrated in Figure 6 below. The specific figure portrays the transactions 
between banks, borrowers, institutional investors, retail investors and special purpose vehicles.  
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Figure 6: Shadow Credit Intermediation 
 
Source: Gordon & Metrick (2010) 
Precisely, Step 3 in Figure 6 corresponds to step A in Figure 5, but with one significant 
alteration. Aiming to achieve safeguard similar to the case of deposit insurance, institutional 
investors accepts collaterals from banks. Actually, this transaction takes the form of a 
repurchase agreement. Specifically, the institutional investor deposits $X and receives some 
asset from the bank as collateral. Next, the bank agrees to repurchase the same asset at some 
future time, which commonly is the following day for $Y9. 
Normally, the total amount of deposit will be lower than the value of the asset used as collateral, 
and the specific difference is called a “haircut.” Gorton and Metrick (2010) provide an example 
of the particular term: If an asset has a market value of $100 and a bank sells it for $80 with an 
agreement to repurchase it for $88, the repo rate is 10 percent (= [88 − 80]/80) and the haircut 
is 20 percent ([100 − 80]/100). Besides, if the bank defaults on its agreement to repurchase the 
asset, the investor keeps the collateral. 
The shadow banking intermediation chain is depicted in Figure 7 below, by directing loans 
after origination towards the wholesale funding. The initial loan moves through the shadow 
                                                          
9 The percentage (Y − X)/X is called the repo rate and is analogous to the interest rate on a bank deposit. 
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banking chain and appears as wholesale funding provided by intermediaries and investors. The 
interesting step that transfers this funding outside form banks’ balance sheets is captured in 
step 4 at Figure 6, where loans are pooled and securitized. The central source of funding that 
supports the credit intermediation process is based on securitization which is another important 
feature of shadow banking structure. 
Figure 7: Shadow Chain of Credit Intermediation 
 
Source: Luttrel et al. (2012) 
3.3.2. Securitization  
Prior to the recent financial crisis, securitization has played an important role in the formation 
of shadow banking system. Most of the times, banks involved in securitization are definitely 
riskier, which is motivated by the higher profits. In that context, securitization permits credit 
originators to sell pools of credit to other institutions, thus transferring credit risk and 
increasing the liquidity available in the market. The particular process is a part of financial 
engineering, which involves pooling various debt obligations into a single security, and selling 
pieces of the consolidated debt as securities to different investors. According to Luttrell et al. 
(2012), each security is linked with the risk exposure of the entire group rather than any sole 
obligation, and in that way the corresponding asset value is securitized by its collateral. 
Therefore, the main benefit of securitization is diversification, since a single loan default has a 
small impact on the whole security. In that way, diversification is accomplished by the 
separation of the security into several pieces called trances. Next, trances are classified 
hierarchically, with the bottom floor trances yielding higher gains and bearing higher risk. In 
contrast, top floor trances are accompanied by lower risk and lower yield. The particular 
securitization process in the case of Mortgage Backed Securities10 (MBS) are depicted in 
Figure 8. 
                                                          
10 MBS: Tradable securities that represent claims on the cash flows from underlying mortgage loans. 
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Figure 8: Securitization 
 
Source: Luttrel et al. (2012) 
The above mentioned procedure can be combined to generate a structured credit product. For 
instance, the well-known CDOs11 are secured by loans, bonds or ABSs. Figure 9, illustrates 
the combination of MBS that generate the final product known as a Collateralized Mortgage 
Obligation (CMO).  
Figure 9: Combined Securitization 
 
Source: Luttrel et al. (2012) 
In general, securitization supports the issuance of new structured credit products that are 
funded in short-term debt markets. The key idea underlying the specific procedure is that 
                                                          
11 Collateralized debt obligation (CDO): A financial instrument that entitles the purchaser to cash flows from a 
portfolio of fixed income assets, which normally include bonds, loans, mortgage-backed securities, or other 
CDOs. (Luttrell et al. (2013)  
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throughout this process, shadow banking participants manage to convert assets of diverse credit 
quality into new investment-grade securities. In summary, the route of steps described for the 
case of MBS and CMO above, accounts for any collateralized claims on pools of loans, 
mortgages, or receivables. Hence, the new security can be pooled, divided into tranches, rated, 
and finally achieve the ultimate goal which is diversification of credit risk. 
3.4. Components 
The particular section of my research includes the most important components of shadow 
banking system. It contains features that have already played a crucial role in the recent 
financial crisis. Notable examples are the Asset Backed Commercial Papers, Repurchase 
agreements, Money Market Mutual Funds and Special Purpose Vernicles.  
3.4.1. Asset-Backed Commercial Papers (ABCPs): 
Asset-backed commercial papers are short-term liabilities aiming to finance long term assets. 
These are usually issued by special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which are controlled by large 
commercial banks. Due to their construction, ABCPs have become one of the main parts of 
shadow banking, since they provide liquidity and cost less than regular bank funding. 
According to Claessens et al. (2012), during the crisis, the greatest amount of leverage growth 
in wholesale banking was attributed mainly on ABCPs short-term borrowing. The reason 
behind that significant increase was that maturity transformation could be achieved efficiently. 
However, that was exactly the same reason for making the shadow banking system extremely 
fragile. 
Figure 10: ABCPs Total Financial Assets 
 
Source: Z1 Flow of Funds 
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In Figure 10 above, we observe the astonishing growth of the particular market until its peak 
of $4.6 trillion in July 2007, accompanied by a sharp decline to $2.5 trillion the following 
years. This sudden reduction continued until its current level, which is approximately $1.5 
trillion. 
3.4.2. Repurchase Agreements (Repos): 
Short-term repurchase agreement refers actually to sale of securities accompanied by an 
agreement that the seller will buy back the securities at the end of the agreement period. The 
repo contract permits both sides to individually impose the end of the agreement, in case of a 
bankruptcy filing by any party. For instance, a depositor, could end its repo if a bank faces 
insolvency problems by selling the collateral. Besides, tri-party repo is a repo agreement with 
a protector bank acting as an intermediary between the two parties of the repo. The tri-party 
construction guarantees that mutually the borrower and the lender are secured against the 
default of the other, since the collateral remains at the third party ownership. 
One crucial factor which explains the increased use of repos, is the fast development of pension 
funds and mutual funds. These entities hold cash mainly for earning interest safely, and in 
parallel maintain the choice to use their cash any time. During the past decades, the particular 
entities have increased in size and become a significant part of the financial environment. 
According to Gorton and Metrick (2010), between 2002 and 2007 the size of Repo markets 
globally, grew with an annual rate of 25%, and reached its peak in mid-200812. Eventually, it 
is no surprising why the usage of repos is in the core of the financial system, since repos are 
usually met all over the financial transactions. For instance, repos could be used to hedge 
derivative positions, take short positions in securities market13, and frequently act as a way to 
increase leverage by hedge funds. 
3.4.3. Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs): 
Money market funds mostly invest in low-risk investments and pay dividends in the form of 
short-term rates. Therefore, MMMFs are an alternative choice of investors to bank savings 
account. However, the major difference is that they are not federally insured like normal 
deposits. Those funds usually invest in state securities, commercial papers, certificates of 
deposit or other highly liquid securities. The concept underlying their existence is that, they 
                                                          
12 Approximately $10 trillion in US market and $11 trillion in Euro repo market. 
13 By using a repo, a market participant can sell a security that she does not own by borrowing it from another 
party in the repo market.  
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attempt to keep their net asset value (NAV) at a constant $1.00 per share. That unique 
characteristic permits MMMFS to be an alternative selection to demand deposits. At the 
begging of 1970s, investors altered their preferences from demand deposits towards MMMFs.  
Figure 11: MMMFs Total Financial Assets 
 
Source: Z1 Flow of Funds 
In line with Figure 11 above, MMMFs faced a sharp increase after 2005, given that their assets 
grew from $1.8 trillion in the 2nd quarter of 2005, to reach their peak at $3.8 trillion in 2008. 
The exact size of MMMFs made them one of the most important financial sectors over the last 
decades. Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), examined the lending behavior of MMMFs that 
engaged to the transmission of distress across borrowers. Based on the authors, the regulation 
of the particular section requires them to invest solely in high-quality securities which bear low 
credit risk. However, this have possibly attributed to the creation of a mistaken sense of safety 
among investors. The idea underlying this is that, banks are obliged by the law to pay for 
deposit insurance, however “the promise to pay $1 per share costs the MMMFs nothing”. 
During the crisis, FED was obliged to act as a lender-of last resort and backup the existence of 
MMMFs sector.  However, an important aspect that is constantly leading to regulatory 
arbitrage is that after the recent financial crisis MMMFs have implicit, cost-free government 
backing, leading them to a superior position over insured demand deposits. This is the exact 
reason for including MMMFs in the empirical analysis that follows in chapter 5. 
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3.4.4. Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs): 
Another significant component of shadow banking is the well-known special purpose vehicles. 
Typically, securitization works by selling huge portfolios of loans to SPVs, which are basically 
legal entities that issue rated securities linked to the loan portfolios. Figure 13 below, illustrates 
how SPVs contribute in the functioning of securitization.  
Figure 12: Special Purpose Vehicles 
 
Source: Gorton and Metrick (2010) 
At the left of Figure 12, an originating company borrows money to a number of borrowers. 
Next, couple of these loans pooled into a single portfolio, which are finally sold to a SPV.  
Next, the SPV funds this process by selling securities in the capital markets. As already 
mentioned, these securities are categorized into tranches, which are ranked by seniority and 
rated accordingly. Ultimately, with the contribution of SPVs, securities move away from the 
balance sheet of the company and achieve to be traded in the market through off-balance sheet 
transactions. 
Actually, such a vehicle has a unique purpose for being created, which is the acquisition and 
financing of specific assets. Based on Thiemann (2012), the rules governing SPVs are set down 
in advance and carefully define their activities. The major feature of those SPVs is that they do 
not have employees and physical location. Other reasons justifying the growth of the particular 
component is related to bankruptcy issues. First, SPVs are not affected by the insolvency of 
the originating company and secondly SPV on its’ own is created so that it can never become 
legally bankrupt. It is straightforward, that their complex existence could reduce bankruptcy 
cost, fact that eventually proved illusionary for market participants. Finally, during the crisis 
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banks were forced to bring these vehicles back on their balance sheets despite their bankruptcy-
remote design (Luttrel et al. 2012). In summary, while SPVs were effective mechanisms of 
wholesale funding prior to the crisis, eventually they contributed in the transmission of the 
financial crisis in a remarkable way. 
3.5. Benefits 
Shadow banking is not only a dark and distrustful system that functions outside the regulatory 
environment. In fact, apart from the associated dangers, shadow banking activities set up an 
important role in the financial system and its benefits should not be underestimated. Most of 
the times, shadow banks have lower cost of funding compared to traditional banks. For 
instance, when shadow banks borrow in the commercial paper market, their cost of financing 
is usually lower. Additionally, those banks also tend to have higher financial leverage14, since 
they exploit increasing profits in boom periods. Compared to traditional banking, the major 
benefit of shadow banking system is that it functions at a lower cost of transactions for the 
majority of its operations. Interestingly, FSB states that there are several advantages 
accompanied with the functioning of shadow banking system. Moreover, Sinha (2013), claims 
that shadow banking system, plays a crucial role in providing access to financial services, 
enhancing competition, liquidity and diversification among the sector. 
In addition, Perotti (2012) argues that shadow banks by some means complete traditional banks 
while adding economic strength as they contribute in the resilience of the financial system to 
exogenous shocks. Even though that may sound quite contradictive, the author claims that 
during the crisis, shadow banking acted as a backup during the panic, given that a run on the 
system has been observed. In summary, apart from the unquestionable implications that are 
accompanied with the functioning of shadow banking system, the majority of academics and 
researchers agree that it constitutes as an alternative funding for the real economy, which is 
merely beneficial when traditional banking is under distress. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Level of borrowed funds compared to their own funds. 
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3.6. Implications 
Aside from the positive features attributed to the shadow banking system, its’ functioning could 
easily trigger hazards and eventually lead to systemic risk. This could deliver various 
implications, mainly due to its complexity, cross jurisdictional nature and interconnectedness 
with the banking system.  First of all, significant source of risk is attributed to liquidity risk 
since, shadow banks could easily be exposed to their creditors, due to maturity mismatch. 
Secondly, shadow banks do not face regulatory limitations on borrowings, leading them to 
become extremely leveraged. Furthermore, this situation transmits instability from the 
financial system towards the real economy, making leverage risk another important implication 
of the system. Eventually, another drawback is the linkage of shadow banking with the 
traditional banking sector. Meaning that, under periods of uncertainty, when lack of confidence 
is spread across the financial system, contagion risk is threatening the function of the global 
economy.  
Subsequently, the securitization process through the mid-2000s involved trillions of dollars of 
securitized products. For example, according to Szunke (2014) that has explicitly examined 
the role of shadow banking in the creation of instability prior to the crisis, 75% of total financial 
turnover on a global scale, was related to transactions involving derivatives. It is 
straightforward, what consequences a collapse of such a market could have on the real 
economy15.Theoretically, the separation of risk occurring through securitization allocates risk 
to those who are willing to take it, resulting in more effecient risk pricing. Besides, 
securitization permits loan issuers to sell pools of debt to other investors, therefore relocating 
credit risk. In practice however, the process became unexpectedly complex since speculation 
altered the functioning of the system. Eventually, the period that financial engineering boomed, 
provided cheap but mispriced credit. The risk of this vulnerable growth was mainly undertaken 
by unsophisticated investors that were unaware of the above-mentioned risks, which proved 
catastrophic for the global economy. 
3.6.1. Regulatory Arbitrage 
A major implication that is explicitly discussed below, refers to the concept of regulatory 
arbitrage. Normally, banks are regulated and monitored to guarantee the stability of the 
financial system. Following the financial crisis, authorities and regulators have profoundly 
strengthened their supervision towards traditional banks. Consequently, aiming to escape the 
                                                          
15 Nowadays, the particular market is considered as an indicator to measure systemic risk in the banking sector. 
 
 
 
25 
 
high cost of regulation, credit intermediation has moved towards the shadow banking sector. 
Despite the fact that, shadow banks played an important role prior to the crisis, nowadays they 
are used as an alternative to traditional banking due to stricter regulations on the latter. Thus, 
the linkage between traditional and shadow banks, is an essential concern that must be 
considered by regulators. According to several analysts, regulatory arbitrage is one of the 
dominant factors supporting the role of shadow banking. European Central Bank considered 
regulatory arbitrage as one of the main risks accompanied with shadow banking system. 
Moreover, a recent study by Harris et al. (2014) examined the efficiency of banks capital 
regulations when banks face competition from the shadow banking system. The authors argue 
that, the competition between traditional banks and shadow banks is expected to lessen the 
efficacy of capital regulations. Furthermore, the authors claim that, after an increase in banks 
capital requirements, banks are forced to switch from safe investments to risky ones in order 
to cover those regulatory requirements. The particular paper, highlights the relationship 
between regulation and the run towards shadow banking due to regulatory arbitrage. 
Various regulations applied to banks are constantly avoided by moving components of the 
credit intermediation chain towards shadow banks. Hence, transferring of risks played an 
important role in the development of the crisis and according to several analysts, still plays a 
significant role in the financial stability. Based the theoretical analysis that was thoroughly 
presented in the first part, regulatory arbitrage is the main reason that motivated investors 
towards the functioning of investment funds, which is analyzed in detail in the next chapter. 
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4. Investment Funds 
The particular section focuses on the motivation for including the broad category of investment 
funds in the empirical part of my study. As a starting point, the following analysis is mainly 
based upon two recent papers that deal with the broad concept of investment funds. Namely, 
the first study conducted by Doyle et al. (2016), highlights the link between investment funds 
and potential adverse impacts on the whole financial system. Next, Vershinina et al. (2016) 
discusses the major benefits and drawbacks of investment funds sector. 
Under regular conditions, investment funds offer significant intermediation services to the real 
sector and at the same time contribute in boosting liquidity and diversification of market risk. 
On the other side, its quick growth encompasses several threats that stimulates the need for 
better monitor and supervision. Specifically, investment funds involvement in the capital 
market is constantly growing and has not been affected by the recent financial crisis. Thus, the 
risk of massive fire sales in the sector might be proven distrustful in the upcoming period. 
Investment funds mainly deal with concepts like synthetic leverage and liquidity 
transformation, which automatically makes them source of systemic risk. The broad concept 
of investment funds includes categories such as: 
 Money Market Funds 
 Bond Funds 
 Equity Funds 
 Exchange Traded Funds 
 Multi Assets funds 
 Direct Investment Funds 
 Real Estate Funds 
 Mortgage Funds 
 Index Funds 
 Loan Funds 
 Commodity Funds 
 Hedge Funds 
 Long-Term Direct Investment Funds 
According to Doyle et al. (2016), vulnerabilities within the investment fund sector are growing 
and it is crucial to examine their linkage with the real economy. In that context, my paper 
utilizes available data and aims to draw definite conclusions on the sector’s contribution to 
systemic risk.  The above mentioned threats, could easily spread towards the banking sector 
since their asset value growth is 40% bigger compared 2009. Besides, the increasing presence 
of investment funds on capital markets, makes them vulnerable to unexpected changes in asset 
prices. Meaning that, even a small, insignificant event could possibly trigger a huge sale of 
assets. 
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The authors argue that the foremost concern, is towards the demandable equity in open-end 
funds16 that could certainly generate a fire sale. Increased risk-taking is apparent in the sector, 
since capital allocation has gradually moved from lower to medium and finally to high risk 
level of investments. In particular, during the period 2013-2015, investment funds alerted their 
asset allocation from lower towards higher yield level of debt securities, and at the same time 
the average maturity increased by nearly a year. 
At the beginning of 2010, investment funds held approximately 10% of all debt securities 
outstanding. Nowadays, the particular proportion has reached 12%, meaning that a significant 
risk among the sector is potential liquidity shortages during turmoil periods. Therefore, a 
negative liquidity spiral could be sustained under such liquidity conditions, since initial asset 
price alterations would upsurge and trigger repeated margin calls in the market17. During the 
past five years, significant market events led to persistent periods of distress which supported 
the alternation of investment policies. For example, the constant sovereign debt-sustainability 
concerns in the European Union resulted large outflows from the region during 201118. Despite 
the fact that, asset managers should follow the demand for large outflow requests, managers 
on their own might have reasons to sell-off assets, as well. For instance, managers might wish 
to adjust their portfolios in a timely manner, aiming to be covered from future outflows. 
In line with Canofari et al. (2014), herding among fund managers and the unsophisticated 
actions of noise traders is a key concern related to the investment funds sector. Particularly, 
under distress periods, additional characteristics could possible exaggerate herding behavior 
among asset managers, such as, performance benchmarking or the constant growth of passive 
investments. In overall, as Figure 13 highlights, investment funds turn out to be a crucial 
constituent of the financial system and still maintain a relatively steady proportion of its total 
share19. Based on the figure below, investment funds sector confronted diverse drifts 
throughout the period 1975-2015. The sector faced two sudden drops during the dot-com 
crunch and the recent subprime crisis. However, it recovered and nowadays continues to grow 
even further. In particular, Figure 13, underlines the magnitude of fragility that lies beneath the 
sector. In other words, the global economy is being threatened by an unexpected and 
                                                          
16 Types of investment fund are mainly categorized in open-end, closed-end, exchange-traded and interval. 
17 In terms of systemic risk, it is has not yet empirically explained, how fund managers act under such risky market 
situations and how their actions affect market prices and liquidity. 
18 European high-yield institutional funds faced outflows larger than 15% of their total assets. 
19 According to Botta et al. (2015), the corresponding proportion counts from 30% to 35% of the total financial 
system. 
 
 
 
28 
 
uncontrolled sell-off in investment fund assets that could be provoked any time in the future. 
As a final point, investment funds have ultimately converted to a major component of the 
financial system, and its existence seems to be constantly growing over the recent years.  
Figure 13: Investment Funds 
 
Source: Botta, et al. (2015) 
 4.1. Advantages of Investment Funds 
Definitely, the huge grow of the investment funds sector is supported by several advantages. 
Below, based on Vershinina et al. (2016), my analysis denotes a couple of significant benefits 
that are usually met in the particular sector.  
The most important characteristic that any investor seeks to achieve is risk diversification 
among various investments. Thus, by selecting to invest in the particular funds, investors 
manage to reduce the existing investment risk by allocating their funds in different countries 
worldwide. The comparative advantage of investment funds is that they normally offer an 
established asset pool, comprising by several billions. Besides, ceteris paribus, a management 
company can invest assets accumulated within an investment fund in different entities, and 
achieve risk reduction. Obviously, an individual investor can achieve diversification as well, 
though, under this scenario its effectiveness is considerably lesser than in the investment fund 
case. 
Secondly, as a general rule, investment funds are controlled by management companies, which 
accumulate, process and examine huge amount of information. These companies, control a vast 
amount of minor investments, in one big portfolio and eventually achieve to reduce costs per 
unit of invested capital (economies of scale). Another advantage is that investment funds are 
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available to anyone, no matter their educational background or market experience20. Finally, 
investment funds allow investors to choose the optimal investment strategy depending on 
several factors, such as different geographical regions, currencies, time to maturity, risk and 
expected return. 
4.2. Vulnerabilities of Investment Funds 
On the other hand, investment funds encompass numerous of disadvantages that actually make 
the sector as one of the most unsafe components of the financial system. First of all, 
vulnerabilities may arise under the form of liquidity transformation or increased leverage that 
are analyzed in detail below. Additionally, a major vulnerability of the sector, is that it 
encompasses sub-sectors like hedge funds that are broadly unregulated, since they are referring 
solely to sophisticated investors. Those professionally managed funds engage in risky 
investments and contribute in the expansion of systemic risk. In the case of hedge funds, 
tracking of the original credit and counterparty risk is a relatively complex process. The 
complexity arises throughout the credit risk transferring, since hedge funds are less transparent 
and more complex than most other financial entities. 
For instance, in 1998 Long Term Capital Market and Amaranth Advisors faced liquidity 
problems through runs on funds’ repos and other types of short term financing. Despite the fact 
that, both funds had reported positive equity, ultimately they were unable to meet margin calls 
on their short-term funding21. Additionally, during the global financial crisis, this type of runs 
occurred again. More specifically, in 2007 hedge funds controlled by Lehman Brothers and 
Bear Stearns faced troubles meeting margin calls and funding at short-term. Even though the 
possible losses in the sector are burdened by fund investors, as in many cases in the past, social 
costs linked with liquidity transformation and leverage proved distressing for the real economy. 
Below, three particular vulnerabilities of investment funds are explicitly analyzed. Namely, 
liquidity transformation, leverage and run risk. 
Liquidity transformation: A basic function of investment funds is to perform liquidity 
transformation, which is expected to deliver a positive return. Investors are able to invest in 
less liquid-high yielding assets, and at the same time retrieve their funds at short-term. 
However, liquidity transformation bears a financial stability risk comparable to the traditional 
                                                          
20 Even though that might be included in the drawbacks of the sector as well. 
21 Long Term Capital Market is a popular example of shadow banking institution, which had to be bailed out by 
FED and 16 other financial institutions. Supervisors and big market participants worried that a probable fall of 
LTCM could bring down the whole financial system. 
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run-risk on deposits. The particular threat might not be apparent, until a sudden event forces 
the majority of investors to convert their shares simultaneously. 
The resulting consequences would be, increasing yield spreads in the underlying securities and 
asset liquidation cost accompanied by incapability to sell fund shares. The specific 
consequences would probably lead investors, to maximize their utility functions by “escaping” 
a troubled fund. Nevertheless, this namely first-move advantage is expected to trigger 
uncertainty among investors, which could eventually result into greater cost for the financial 
system (Doyle et al. 2016). In the long run, during turmoil conditions, investment funds are 
expected to require more liquidity, fact that could generate a domino effect. 
Leverage: Normally, leverage in the investment fund sector is produced synthetically by 
utilizing derivatives, repurchase agreements and securities. Derivatives or securities financing 
transactions produce provisional liabilities, which are materialized if any position bears losses 
or margins are raised. The aforementioned liabilities contribute to the growing of risk, since 
they are not disclosed on companies’ balance sheets. An important difference between 
investment funds and traditional banking sector is that investors can request their equity at a 
short-term. Besides, equity is considered as a less stable source of funding in the sector which 
adds risk on the whole financial system. According to Bengtsson (2013), massive outflows 
could impact the leverage ratios and consequently funds might be forced to sell assets22. The 
negative feature in the case of investment funds, is that leveraged funds has to sell greater 
proportion of assets compared to unleveraged funds. In terms of the leverage magnitude, the 
larger it is, the greater is its contribution to increased instability throughout the financial 
system.  
Run risk: In the past, investment funds have repeatedly been accused for fueling financial 
bubbles, mainly through herding behavior. The aftermath of a run in the particular sector would 
be a direct contagion to the traditional banking sector. Definitely, investors have various 
reasons to run on a troubled fund. According to Davis (2003), there is a great possibility that 
institutional investors might need direct public sector rescues in the future. Regarding the case 
of the recent financial crisis, the run on investment funds occurred and in turn contributed to 
runs on various credit and money markets23. Broadly speaking, run risk is defined as the risk 
                                                          
22 In order to meet the previous level of leverage. 
23 The Primary Fund in United States, gained market share by investing in higher-yielding papers, including 
Lehman Brothers notes. In mid-September 2008 a run on the fund was triggered and within four days, investors 
had redeemed 97% of the fund shares. (Davis, 2003). 
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that a significant amount of investors would like to liquidate their assets simultaneously. The 
process which generates the specific risk involves demandable liabilities, asset liquidation 
costs and creation of first-move advantages. 
Regarding the topic of a run risk due to demandable liabilities, the key characteristic is that 
investment funds are primarily equity-financed and encompass relatively low leverage. Hence, 
despite the fact that investors already know their claims could be retrieved in a short-term by 
the existing assets, their motivations to run on these entities is increased as well. In other words, 
the accompanied asset liquidation could generate a run risk. Next, regarding the asset 
liquidation cost, investors would prefer to redeem their holdings earlier than others, given that, 
fund managers need to adjust their portfolios by liquidating assets. In this context, adjustment 
costs produced by the sale of assets, will normally be reflected by a fund’s NAV and would be 
finally borne by the fund’s shareholders. Consequently, investors would have increased 
incentives to exchange shares quickly compared to others and a speculative run on the fund 
might be triggered. 
In the light of the aforementioned paragraphs, investment funds entail various vulnerabilities, 
hence attracting much attention in terms of regulation and supervision. In the following chapter 
I develop the hypothesis that my empirical analysis seeks to answer, in terms of the function 
of investment funds accompanied by the empirical specification and main results. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Hypothesis Stating 
Based on previous literature, and precisely on a paper provided by Sunderam (2014), the 
empirical part of my study, attempts to identify a relationship between the growth of investment 
funds and money demand. Therefore, the hypothesis under examination is based on Sunderam's 
(2014) model which states that, investors treat shadow banking activities and Treasury bills as 
substitutes. In other words, when demand for Treasury bills is high, as reflected by low 
Treasury bill yields, the demand for shadow banking services is high as well. The hypothesis 
is that shadow banking system replies to this demand by a constant growth in the whole 
investment fund sector: 
H1. Investment funds growth is positively related to T-bills demand. 
Given that, an increase in money demand, would directly lower Treasury bill yields, low yields 
on Treasury bills are expected to forecast growth in investment funds NAV. In contrast, if 
investment funds and T-bills are substitutes, an increase in Treasury bill supply, by increasing 
T-bill yield, is expected to lower the magnitude of investment funds expansion. In line with 
the author, low yields on Treasury bills should be associated with the growing of shadow 
banking activities. In this context, the succeeding results are expected to provide robust 
evidence that investors run towards various sectors of investment funds and eventually 
constitute to the growth of shadow banking until nowadays. The reason for analyzing the 
relationship between investment funds and money demand is that, recent regulatory arbitrage 
conditions in the financial market, led specific parts of the shadow banking system to grow 
even further (Bengtsson, 2013). Therefore, attempts to understand the origins of an imminent 
crisis, might be proven beneficial on terms of future regulations. 
5.2. Data and Empirical Specification 
The aim of the particular study is to capture a relationship between investment funds growth 
and money demand in terms of a time series analysis. Therefore, the aggregate database 
includes various series retrieved from Z1 Flow of Funds statistics24, which are provided by the 
U.S. Federal Reserve System. Based on the availability of data, my analysis implements 
quarterly observations regarding the period 2002Q1 to 2015Q4. The role of dependent variable 
plays each time a selected series from the investment funds sector. The first dependent variable 
comes from L.121 series, which is the total financial assets of Money Market Mutual Funds. 
                                                          
24 Data available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=Z.1  
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Next, total financial assets of Mutual Funds (L.122), total financial assets of Closed-End Funds 
(L.123) and finally the total financial assets of Exchange-Traded Funds (L.124) were obtained, 
as well. Those series are specified as the dependent variable in each of the following 
regressions, while the independent variable each time is a constant series that was generated in 
order to reflect money demand. Finally, regarding the dependent variables, given that my 
hypothesis investigates a linkage between the growth of those funds and money demand, a new 
series were generated corresponding to the growth of the particular investment funds. 
Next, on the right hand side of each regression and in line with Sunderam (2014), I retrieved 
from Bloomberg terminal, the quarterly Treasury bill yield and the quarterly Overnight Index 
Swap (OIS) rate of US. Paraphrasing author’s argument, the OIS rate reflects the anticipated 
average of the federal funds rate in a given term. In general, OIS rate corresponds to an ideal 
baseline for the overall level of short term interest rates. Finally, the spread between Treasury 
bill minus OIS (Tbill-OIS), is expected to capture the information in Treasury bill about the 
money premium. The author has proved that, by implementing the Treasury bill-OIS spread as 
an explanatory variable, we achieve to strip out variation in the Treasury bill yield driven by 
changes in the overall level of short-term interest rates, (Sunderam, 2014). Figure 14 depicts 
the graphical representation of the similar route that the two series follow. 
Figure 14: T-bill and OIS rate 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Finally, the four equations below correspond to the four regressions that were implemented 
with the usage of E-views statistical package. 
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 GMMMF = α +β *(T -bill−OISt) + εt  (1) 
 GMF = α+β*(T -bill−OISt) + εt  (2) 
 GCEF = α+β*(T –bill- OISt) + εt  (3) 
 GETF = α+β*(T -bill− OISt) + εt  (4) 
,where GMMMF in equation (1) represents the growth of Money Market Mutual Funds, GMF 
in equation (2) is the growth of Mutual Funds. Next, GCEF in equation (3) reflects the growth 
of Closed End Funds and GETF in equation (4) stands for the growth of Exchange Traded 
Funds. Table 1 below, illustrates the summary of descriptive statistics considering the four 
dependent variables and the spread between T-bill and OIS rate. In the bottom of the table, it 
is also included the correlation of each dependent variable with the independent variable. As 
we can derive from Table 1, GMMMF has a negative and significant correlation with the 
explanatory variable. The following two correlation values of GMF and GCEF are positive and 
significant as expected, while the last observation (0.065738) signifies that there no significant 
correlation between the growth of Exchange Traded Funds and money demand. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Tbill-OIS GMMMF GMF GCEF GETF 
 Mean -0.180734 0.004322 0.020668 0.012589 0.062812 
 Median -0.086833 -0.00595 0.0281 0.017825 0.063175 
 Maximum 0.012 0.12591 0.17131 0.14314 0.26078 
 Minimum -1.103333 -0.10015 -0.20454 -0.199 -0.11685 
 Std. Dev. 0.257853 0.045218 0.069807 0.055284 0.086266 
 Skewness -2.587494 0.78193 -0.669948 -1.29644 0.264072 
 Kurtosis 8.843456 3.717169 4.258034 7.358498 2.923278 
 Jarque-Bera 142.1618 6.906645 7.881935 60.01222 0.664585 
 Probability 0 0.03164 0.019429 0 0.717277 
 Sum -10.1211 0.24202 1.1574 0.70497 3.5175 
Sum Sq.Dev. 3.656853 0.112456 0.268016 0.1681 0.409299 
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 
Correlation 
with Tbill-
OIS 
1 -0.66101 0.291456 0.451239 0.065738 
t-Statistic   -6.473287 2.238961 3.715719 0.48412 
 
5.3. Empirical Findings 
As an initial step, my analysis began by checking the series under examination for stationarity 
at levels. The five series were all stationary compared to their critical values, on at least 5% 
level of significance. Hence there was no need to continue by taking the first or even the second 
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differences in our sample25. Next, Table 2 illustrates the aggregate empirical results, after 
running the four regressions with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. 
Table 2: Regressions Output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Table 2 presents the four regressions as specified in section 5.2. The dependent variable in equation 
(1) is the growth of Money Market Mutual Funds (GMMMF). The dependent variable in equation (2) is 
the growth of Mutual Funds (GMF). The dependent variable in equation (3) is the growth of Close-End 
Funds (GCEF). The dependent variable in equation (4) is the growth of Exchange Traded Funds (GETF).  
The explanatory variable in all the four equations is stable and is reflected by the difference between 
Treasury bill yield and Overnight Index Swap (Tbill-OIS). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
The date spans from 2002Q1-2015Q4. Notation of ***, ** and * denote statistical of significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Regarding the first column of Table 2, the value of (-0.11592) indicates that, if money demand 
in US increases by 1% the growth of MMMFs is expected to decrease approximately by 11.5%. 
The particular finding is statistically significant at 1% level. Moreover, the specific result is 
not surprising at all, if we have a second look on Figure 11, which refers to MMMFs. The 
graphical representation indicates that following the crisis the particular component of shadow 
banking has faced a run and did not continue to jeopardize the financial system. Hence, the 
negative relationship between the specific series and money demand is by some means 
rationale, since MMMFs are not anymore treated as an alternative choice to demand deposits. 
Sunderam (2014) has proved that a potential positive relationship between shadow banking 
components (which in the particular case are selected series of investment funds sector) and 
money demand is a relatively worrying indicator, in terms of financial stability. Therefore, 
considering the period under examination, it is obvious from Table 2 (see columns 2 and 3), 
that the growth of Mutual Funds and Closed End Funds are positively and statistically 
significant related with money demand. Precisely, if money demand in US increases by 1%, 
growth of MFs and CEFs are expected to increase by 7.8% and 8% respectively26. The 
particular findings are highly distressing, since those results prove that specific parts of the 
shadow banking system continue to grow in terms of their total financial assets. Sunderam 
                                                          
25The complete tables of Dickey Fuller test are included in the Appendix, (page I). 
26 The complete tables of regressions are included in the Appendix, (page III). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GMMMF GMF GCEF GETF 
Constant -0.016628*** 0.034929*** 0.014796** 0.066787*** 
 (0.005605) (0.01103) (0.006517) (0.014219) 
Tbill-OIS -0.115916*** 0.078904** 0.080692*** 0.021993 
 (0.017907) (0.035241) (-0.029649) (-0.045429) 
R-squared 0.436934 0.084947 0.203617 0.004321 
N 56 56 56 56 
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(2014) in his paper identified a positive statistically significant relationship between ABCPs 
and money demand when he examined pre-crisis data (2002-2007). The particular finding 
highlights that the above results in terms of MFs and CEFs indicate a highly vulnerable 
environment. In terms of R2 analysis, the value of 0.43 in the first column, signifies that money 
demand explains approximately 43% of the growth in MMMFs. Similarly, money demand 
explains 8.5% of Mutual Funds and 20% of Close-End Funds variation. 
Finally, as it is apparent in Figure 15 below, Exchange Traded Funds faced a huge expansion 
after the recent financial crisis, which justifies the reason for including the particular fund in 
the empirical analysis. Still, findings after regressing equation (4) indicate that there is no 
statistical significant relationship between the particular series and money demand (4th column 
of Table 2). 
Figure 15: Exchange Traded Funs: Total Financial Assets 
 
Source: Z1 Flow of Funds 
Next, the existence of Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity in all regressions were tested, by 
implementing the Breusch-Godfrey LM Test and White Test respectively27. The empirical 
findings in terms of Heteroscedasticity indicate that OLS assumption of residuals constant 
variance is validated, since we failed to reject the null hypothesis of no Heteroscedasticity 
(Homoskedasticity) in all regressions. Besides, in terms of autocorrelation, in three out of four 
cases we failed to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, meaning that error terms are 
uncorrelated and findings are constituent with Gauss Markov theorem. However, in equation 
                                                          
27The complete tables of Breusch-Godfrey and White tests are included in the Appendix, (pages V and VII). 
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(3), the issue of autocorrelation is identified, which violates the OLS assumption of no error 
terms correlation. In order to solve the particular problem, the “Durbin Two-Step Method” was 
implemented, which provided us the correct output depicted in Table 2. Finally, the Chow 
Breakpoint test was implemented to check if a break-point exists in the level of the series. The 
null hypothesis in this case is a structural stability, meaning that, by rejecting the null 
hypothesis we identify a structural break in the sample. According to the empirical findings, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis since the F-test value is greater than the critical value and 
in addition p-value is close to zero28. The particular findings are apparent as well in Figure 16 
below which illustrate the results of the CUSUM test, apart from the 4th regression (GETFs), 
in which the results carry no interpretation since results are statistically insignificant. Precisely, 
the red dotted line indicates no alternation in coefficient sign at 5% level of significance. 
Figure 16: CUSUM Test 
 
 
  
                                                          
28 The complete tables of Chow Breakpoint test are included in the Appendix, (page IX). 
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6. Discussion 
Following the empirical part, a discussion based on the treatment of regulatory authorities 
towards shadow banking system is analyzed, accompanied by suggestions in terms of factors 
aiming to mitigate the risk of investment funds. 
6.1. Regulatory Delusion 
Throughout the literature review on the broad topic of shadow banking, a paper conducted by 
Fein (2003), treated its existence with a completely unconditional way. The following part of 
my thesis, highlights some facts of the specific paper that are in contrast with the mainstream 
approach towards shadow banking. The author claims that, shadow banking exists as an 
integral part of the regulated banking system. The particular claim, is supported by the fact 
that, main entities of shadow banking system accomplish a beneficial function in the financial 
system (Fein, 2013). In addition, those activities could increase efficiency, rise the supply of 
credit to the real sector, offer greater risk diversification and finally boost market competition. 
In that context, regulators massively permitted those functions which allowed big banking 
organizations to convert into “leaders” in the shadow banking system. What is interesting here, 
is that prior to the crisis, supervisors accepted the abovementioned benefits, yet they currently 
include them in the shadow banking system. Somehow, proportion of the blame should also be 
directed towards regulatory authorities, since they did not adequately understand the risks of 
those activities. The author states that, the delusion among banking regulators, that shadow 
banking system is separated than the regulated banking system, is a feature that might be 
proven disastrous. Still, what is surprising, is that supervisors continue to mislead themselves 
with the idea that shadow banking is a system outside the regulated banking sector. In the past, 
regulators failed to perceive that, large commercial banks had become the largest shadow 
banks, and according to Fein (2013), they have not fully grasped the conversion of traditional 
banks into shadow banks. Based on this perceptive, the former Treasury Secretary of FED, 
highlights the whole debate regarding shadow banking regulation in a modest still inspired 
parallelism.  
“Imagine building a national highway system with two sets of drivers. The first group has to 
abide by the speed limit, wear seatbelts, and buy cars with anti-lock brakes. The second group 
can drive as fast as they choose with no safety features and without any fear of getting pulled 
over by the police. Imagine both groups are driving on the same roads. That system would 
inevitably cause serious collisions, and drivers following the rules of the game would inevitably 
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get hit by drivers who weren’t. A system like that makes no sense. We would never allow it on 
the roads, so why do we allow it in our economy?” 
Timothy Geithner (2010) 29 
Therefore, the precise meaning of the above statement is that, there is no need to blame for the 
financial crisis on entities outside the regulated banking system. In contrast, the direction 
should be towards the view that shadow banking is an integral part of the regulated banking 
system. Besides, economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, such as Adrian and 
Ashcraft (2012), or Pozsar and Adrian (2012) have started to treat shadow banking as part of 
the regulated banking system. Actually, they have recognized banking organizations as the 
main “drivers” of the shadow banking system. Finally, according to Fein (2013), authorities 
need to recognize shadow banking, not as parallel to and discrete from the traditional banking 
system, but as the same source of systemic risk. 
It is crucial to recognize that, the theoretically separated banking systems are closely associated 
since securitization, credit intermediation, liquidity supply and investment markets are vital 
features for the functioning of the traditional banking system. In this context, Figure 17 below 
presents the most recent available data in terms of the 10 biggest banks in the world. The reason 
for including the particular figure is, to highlight the possible consequences that could arise in 
a future turmoil scenario. Counting only for the top banks of the world in terms of their asset 
value, it is easy to suspect that traditional banks comprehend unregulated activities as well. 
Figure 17: Biggest banks in the world. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Database 
                                                          
29 Former American central banker who served as Secretary of the Treasury. Statement at a hearing on Public 
Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner, (April 20, 2010). 
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In summary, there is no question that shadow banking is a major reason that provoked the 
recent financial crisis. However, it is apparent that regulators misjudged the evolution of 
financial risks within the regulated banking system and at the same time, allowed large banking 
organizations to enter into shadow banking activities with insufficient capital, liquidity and 
supervisory oversight.  Above all, the crisis in the shadow banking system was a crisis of the 
regulated banking system and adequate measures should be implemented immediately in order 
to avoid a future collapse.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
7.1. Suggestions 
Specific factors that could possibly mitigate the accompanied risk in the broad investment fund 
sector are mentioned in prior examinations. For instance, Agarwal and Naik (2004), examined 
the systematic risk exposures of investment funds. The authors argue that, under any adverse 
situation, funds could trigger a contagion effect. Still, this scenario could be mitigated by 
sufficient risk management and leverage restrictions. Besides, sufficient liquidity management 
systems, provide the opportunity to better monitor liquidity risk and to guarantee that the 
liquidity outline of investments conforms to its underlying requirements. Additionally, 
liquidity management tools could be utilized from fund managers for issues in which an 
investment fund comes upon liquidity shortfall. 
Next, in line with Lehecka and Ubl (2015) who analyzed potential indicators that could identify 
systemic risks related to investment funds, little evidence supports the efficiency of liquidity 
management tools throughout episodes of huge redemptions. In that context, liquidity 
regulation has been proved efficient during calm periods, while historical data do not indicate 
the same effectiveness throughout stress periods.  According to Fung and Hsieh (2001), who 
analyzed the risk in investment strategies, funds exposure should never overcome funds’ total 
NAV. Besides, NAV of each fund should be annually disclosed and reported. Next, similarly 
to the traditional banking sector, stress-tests at institutional and systematic level need to be 
established as well. Considering further complex investment strategies, the approach of value 
at risk should be definitely imposed. Precisely, funds need to disclose once a year data 
refereeing to the lowest, highest, and average value at risk estimations.  
In summary, regulators should impose restrictions on liquidity transformation, accompanied 
by prudential measures aiming to safeguard the resilience of the sector to shocks and the 
contagion of investment fund distress to other financial institutions. The most important goal 
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among national authorities, would be the avoidance of regulatory arbitrage by the 
implementation of supplementary supervisory tools towards the shadow banking system. 
7.2. Limitations 
As already mentioned, the financial data utilized in my research were retrieved from Flow of 
Funds statistics, which is provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The main limitation 
in the particular database has to do with off-balance sheet statistics and other segments that are 
not included in the regulatory framework. As more elaborate data regarding various financial 
institutions and their activities will be accumulated, an enhanced examination of the sector will 
be possible in the future. However, until then, deeper examinations need to be conducted in 
order to assess shadow banking structure and exposure. Additionally, data regarding hedge 
funds and derivatives are absent from the aforementioned database. Given that derivatives 
reflect risks related to the securities which could possible affect other fractions of the financial 
system, an ideal database would include such source of exposure. 
In summary, the connections between shadow banking and traditional banking sector are not 
suitably captured in Flow of Funds statistics. The empirical findings presented in chapter 5 
were primarily based on quarterly observations, however data availability on more frequent 
observations, such as monthly or even weekly, would definitely deliver superior results. 
Undoubtedly, it is suggested that future studies should incorporate series containing more 
frequent data that are not yet disclosed by various financial institutions. Finally, taking into 
consideration the aforementioned limitations, future research based on an enhanced database 
would be in a place to deliver further evidence on the subject of shadow banking. 
7.3. Conclusions 
The global financial system is constantly evolving towards a sophisticate and complex 
direction. Prior to 2008, the existing system allowed large institutions to take on excessive risks 
without effective constraints. In that context, shadow banking operated alongside and grew to 
be almost as big as the traditional banking system. The delusion among banking regulators, 
that the two sectors should be treated differently, is a feature that might be proven disastrous 
in the future. Aiming to achieve a stable growth of the economy, we need to focus on the 
systemic evolution of shadow banking by addressing the potential risks associate with its 
function, and eventually derive particular policies. Moreover, a financial incident in any 
country may trigger series of reactions that could jeopardize the financial stability of the entire 
world. 
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The particular investigation adds the role of investment funds and fills the particular gap in 
academic literature. Investment funds functioning increase interconnectedness between sectors 
of the financial system, and its quick growth encompasses several threats that stimulates the 
need for efficient supervision. Specifically, due to the concept of regulatory arbitrage investors 
run towards this unregulated sector of the system. Meaning that, investment funds involvement 
in capital markets is constantly growing over the recent years. Therefore, the risk of massive 
fire sales in the sector might be proven distrustful in the upcoming period. 
Despite the fact that little empirical evidence exists regarding the subject under scrutiny, my 
analysis reflects alarming findings. Prior research, has proved that a potential positive 
relationship between shadow banking components and money demand is a relatively worrying 
indicator, in terms of financial stability. Based on the empirical outcome, regarding the period 
2002-2015, money demand is positively and statistically significant related with the growth of 
Mutual Funds and Close End Funds. Thus, the particular study merely identifies that shadow 
banking still continues to grow rapidly. On the other side, empirical findings suggest that the 
sector of Money Market Mutual Funds s is negatively affected with money demand, meaning 
that investors do not continue treat the specific funds as an alternative investment to banking 
deposits. 
In conclusion, highly interconnectedness among financial institutions could easily trigger a 
domino effect. Aiming to avoid such a scenario, regulators should impose restrictions on the 
functioning of investment funds, accompanied by prudential measures aiming to safeguard the 
resilience of the sector to shocks. Finally, it is clear that, the current framework of the global 
economy has triggered a new rational among regulators, in terms of what actions should be 
taken in advance, and ultimately achieve to prevent any adverse impacts on the side of the real 
economy. 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Stationarity Tests in All Series (GMMMF, GMF, GCEF, GETF, T-bill-OIS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.216995 0.0242
Test critical values: 1% level -3.555023
5% level -2.915522
10% level -2.595565
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
Null Hypothesis: Tbill-OIS has a unit root
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
GMMMF(-1) -0.552963 0.123132 -4.490802 0
C 0.002997 0.005567 0.538255 0.5927
R-squared 0.275633     Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared 0.261965     S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression 0.041141     Akaike info criterion
Sum squared resid 0.089709     Schwarz criterion
Log likelihood 98.46764     Hannan-Quinn criter.
F-statistic 20.1673     Durbin-Watson stat
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000039
0.000892
0.04789
-3.507914
-3.43492
-3.479687
2.024161
Included observations: 55 after adjustments
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GMMMF)
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2002Q2 2015Q4
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.490802 0.0006
Test critical values: 1% level -3.555023
5% level -2.915522
10% level -2.595565
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
Null Hypothesis: GMMMF has a unit root
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Tbill-OIS(-1) -0.32355 0.100575 -3.216995 0.0022
C -0.060695 0.031721 -1.913423 0.0611
R-squared 0.163366     Mean dependent var -0.001879
Adjusted R-squared 0.14758     S.D. dependent var 0.208217
S.E. of regression 0.19224     Akaike info criterion -0.424463
Sum squared resid 1.958671     Schwarz criterion -0.351469
Log likelihood 13.67273     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.396235
F-statistic 10.34906     Durbin-Watson stat 2.346939
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00221
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(Tbill-OIS)
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2002Q2 2015Q4
Included observations: 55 after adjustments
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
GMF-1) -0.740155 0.132636 -5.580359 0
C 0.015209 0.009654 1.575376 0.1211
R-squared 0.370101     Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared 0.358216     S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression 0.068665     Akaike info criterion
Sum squared resid 0.24989     Schwarz criterion
Log likelihood 70.29528     Hannan-Quinn criter.
F-statistic 31.14041     Durbin-Watson stat
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
-5.51E-05
0.085712
-2.483465
-2.410471
-2.455237
1.900349
Included observations: 55 after adjustments
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(GMF)
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2002Q2 2015Q4
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.793789 0.0051
Test critical values: 1% level -3.555023
5% level -2.915522
10% level -2.595565
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Null Hypothesis: GCEF has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=10)
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Table 4:  Regressions Output (GMMMF, GMF, GCEF, and GETF) 
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Table 5: Autocorrelation Tests 
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Table 6: Heteroskedasticity Tests 
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Table 7: Chow Break Tests (GMMMFs, GMFs and GCEFs) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
